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Abstract 
Previous studies show that information security breaches and privacy violations are important issues for 
organisations and people. It is acknowledged that decreasing the risk in this domain requires consideration of the 
technological aspects of information security alongside human aspects. Employees intentionally or 
unintentionally account for a significant portion of the threats to information assets in organisations. This research 
presents a novel conceptual framework to mitigate the risk of insiders using deterrence and prevention approaches. 
Deterrence factors discourage employees from engaging in information security misbehaviour in organisations, 
and situational crime prevention factors encourage them to prevent information security misconduct. Our findings 
show that perceived sanctions certainty and severity significantly influence individuals’ attitudes and deter them 
from information security misconduct. In addition, the output revealed that increasing the effort, risk and reducing 
the reward (benefits of crime) influence the employees’ attitudes towards prevent information security 
misbehaviour. However, removing excuses and reducing provocations do not significantly influence individuals’ 
attitudes towards prevent information security misconduct. Finally, the output of the data analysis also showed 
that subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and attitude influence individuals’ intentions, and, 
ultimately, their behaviour towards avoiding information security misbehaviour.  
Keywords: Information security, organisation, insider, deterrence, motivation, risk, employee 
1. Introduction 
Several reports show that a significant portion of information security breaches originate from insiders [1-3]. 
Confidentiality of information, particularly when relating to industrial design, infrastructure control, experts’ 
information, organisational information assets and so forth, is an important matter. In addition, information is a 
competitive resource in many organisations, and information leakage has serious consequences for firms, such as 
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reputational damage, loss of revenue, loss of intellectual property, a reduction in productivity and competitive 
advantage, costs arising, and, in the worst-case scenario,  bankruptcy [4, 5]. Information leakage refers to the 
accidental or deliberate transfer of information to an unauthorised person or persons within or outside an 
organisational boundary [6, 7]. It is acknowledged that technology alone cannot ensure a secure environment for 
information assets; the human aspects of information security should also be taken into consideration [8-10]. The 
confidentiality of information and data has managerial aspects. Different experts have presented various 
approaches to protect information with regard to human aspects. Siponen, Adam Mahmood [11], Ma, Jiang [12] 
and Sohrabi Safa, Von Solms [13] consider the idea that complying with organisational information security 
policies and procedures (OISPs) is an effective and efficient avenue for mitigating information security breaches. 
Information security knowledge sharing has been presented as another approach that decreases information 
security threats whilst increasing the knowledge and awareness of employees in the organisation [14, 15]. 
Conscious care behaviour, which is based on information security awareness and experience, has been presented 
as another effective approach that mitigates human mistakes in the domain of information security [16]. However, 
this research aims to investigate the effect of deterrent and preventative factors on employees’ behaviour in order 
to decrease insider threats in organisation.  
Crime is reduced when no motivation exists [17]. In many studies, motivation for crime has been mentioned as 
being an important factor [18, 19]. This is the salient factor that we suggest is used to reduce information security 
misbehaviour in organisations. Motivation can explain individuals’ behaviour in many cases. Motivation is what 
encourages an individual to behave in a specific way or incline towards a certain kind of behaviour. Motivation 
creates a direction for a behaviour [20]. Wang and Hou [21] investigated the effect of altruism, and hard and soft 
rewards as motivational factors that encourage knowledge sharing among employees. In this research, the term 
‘hard rewards’ refers to benefits such as financial rewards in an organisation, while ‘soft rewards’ relate to the 
emotional pleasure such as relationships with significant others or personal reputation. Shibchurn and Yan [20] 
explored the effect of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations on the exposure of information on social networks. The 
results of their study revealed that there are positive correlations between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations with 
information disclosure intention. Several studies investigated the effect of social bond factors – attachment to 
organisation, commitment to organisational aims, involvement in particular activity such as information security 
and personal norms – as motivational factors that encourage employees to comply with OISP [13, 22].  
It is acknowledged that sanctions, as well as rules and regulations, constitute formal controls. Formal controls are 
intended to influence individuals’ behaviour in such a way as to prevent deviant behaviour [23, 24]. The General 
Deterrence Theory (GDT) explains how people avoid deviant behaviour in the context of a society. GDT is based 
on negative motivations innate in formal sanctions. This theory encompasses two important elements – sanction 
certainty and sanction severity. ‘Sanction certainty’ refers to the belief that individuals’ misbehaviour will be 
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detected. ‘Sanction severity’ refers to the fact that the deviant behaviour leads to harsh punishment [25]. The 
punishment mechanism encompasses jailtime, fines, dismissal or denunciation. Both sanction certainty and 
severity negatively influence the intention of individuals to engage in misbehaviour in organisations. GDT is 
amongst the most favoured theories in the information security realm [26, 27]. The motivational and deterrence 
aspects of GDT are two important parts of the research model developed in this study.  
In this paper, the theoretical background with a description of the Deterrence Theory (DT), Situational Crime 
Prevention Theory (SCPT) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) are explained in section two. The research 
conceptual model and its hypotheses are described in section three. The methodology of the research, data 
gathering and demography of the participants are presented in section four. The results of the statistical analysis, 
measurement model (MM) and structural model (SM) are discussed in section five. The contribution and 
implementation of the research are illustrated in section six. Finally, the conclusion, limitations and topics of 
future work are explained in section seven. 
2. Theoretical background 
This study aims to decrease insider threats using a novel approach – deterrence and opportunity reduction for 
information security misbehaviour. We synthesised the DT and SCPT in order to examine how to change the 
attitude and mindset of employees with a view to preventing misconduct in the domain of information security in 
organisations. In addition, the TPB explains how affective factors influence employees’ behaviour. We believe 
that this theoretical background together with a comprehensive literature review increase the reliability of the 
research model. Both the Deterrence and Situational Crime Prevention factors are aligned with each other and 
have the same effect on individuals’ attitude. These two theories, alongside the TPB, show the complete chain of 
behaviour change, and explain how we can improve employees’ information security behaviour and mitigate the 
risk of information security breaches. 
2.1. General Deterrence Theory 
The General Deterrence Theory (GDT) describes human behaviour and decisions in terms of minimising their 
cost and maximizing their benefit to the individual. Losing reputation, competitive advantage, productivity and 
profit can be consequences of employees’ who, through their behaviour, threaten the availability, confidentiality 
and integrity of the information assets in organisations. It is acknowledged that deterrent approaches, such as 
disincentives and sanctions influence the direction of individuals’ behaviour towards avoiding certain actions in 
a community. The effectiveness of such disincentives is based on the certainty and severity of sanctions [28]. If 
an offender realises that his or her criminal act will be detected (sanction certainty) and that the authority will 
consider harsh punishment, such as a fine, jailtime, dismissal, denunciation, or some other forms of punishment 
(sanction severity), he or she will not engage in deviant behaviour [29]. The GDT has been applied as an effective 
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and efficient approach to comply with OISP [30]. In this research, the GDT has been used to show how sanction 
certainty and severity influence the attitude and intention of employees with the effect of preventing deviant 
behaviour in the domain of information security. 
2.2. Situational Crime Prevention Theory 
Motivation and opportunity are two important factors in the formation of different crimes. The Situational Crime 
Prevention Theory (SCPT) explains how we can decrease motivation and opportunity in order to reduce criminal 
activities or delinquent behaviour [31]. The SCPT is a common approach that mitigates motivation and 
opportunity for many types of crime. In this regard, opportunity reduction mechanisms have been acknowledged 
as being an effective and efficient approach toward reducing delinquent behaviour in many communities [32]. 
The SCPT helps management to design an environment to control delinquent behaviour or crime based on 
different perspectives. This approach can be applied in various environments and contexts, such as organisations, 
schools, social networks, ecommerce and other similar communities. Available opportunities and rationalisation 
encourage offenders to conduct illegal activities or crimes. It is acknowledged that if offending is difficult, the 
motivation to perpetrate delinquent behaviour or crime will reduce. The benefit and cost of the offender’s 
behaviour are important to them; hence, the benefit and cost of their actions influence their decision to engage in 
delinquent behaviour [33]. The SCPT mitigates delinquent behaviour by making crimes more difficult and risky, 
and reduces the rewards which constitute the output of the crime, as well as reducing the excuses and provocations 
to prevent rationalization for perpetrating crimes. The situational crime prevention mechanism has been applied 
as an effective and efficient approach to mitigate insider threats in organisations in this research. 
2.3. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Individuals’ behaviour is influenced by their beliefs. Ajzen and Madden [34] proposed the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) to explain human behaviour based on intention, subjective norms and attitudes. The TRA was 
further developed by adding perceived behavioural control to better explain individuals’ behaviour. The TPB 
encompasses attitude, perceived behavioural control, subjective norms, and intention. According to the TPB, if 
people evaluate a behaviour positively (attitude), and if they think that other important persons want to conduct 
their behaviour in the same way (subjective norm), and if they have the ability and potential to perform it 
(perceived behavioural control), then they have a stronger intention to conduct the behaviour. Clearly, the TPB 
can explain human behaviour in various fields, such as public relationships, organisational behaviour, advertising, 
healthcare, and campaigns. Cox [4] explained information security awareness and assurance using TPB. In another 
study, Ifinedo [35] explained compliance with OISP by applying TPB. In the present research, TPB has been used 
in order to develop a conception of how to mitigate the risk of information security misconduct in organisations. 
Figure 1 shows the research model and theories in a concise form. 
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Figure 1: Research model 
 
3. Research model and hypotheses 
This study aims to investigate the effect of sanction certainty and severity as deterrent factors on the one hand, 
and the effect of increasing the effort and risk, reducing the rewards and provocations, and removing excuses as 
situational crime prevention factors, on the other, on employees’ attitude towards preventing misbehaviour in the 
domain of information security. The Deterrence and Situational Crime Prevention Theories alongside the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour depict the effect of these factors on employees’ attitudes, intention, and, ultimately, 
behaviour. Perceived behavioural control and subjective norms also influence the intention of employees towards 
changing their behaviour, based on the TPB. We can see a complete chain of behaviour formation in the research 
model.  
3.1. Perceived sanction certainty and severity 
It is acknowledged that deterrence factors negatively influence the decision of individuals to be involved in crime. 
The GDT has been frequently applied to explain human behaviour in various disciplines. The certainty and 
severity of punishment influences the minds of individuals and their decision to commit crime or engage in 
delinquent behaviour. Based on Deterrence Theory, to some degree, human behaviour is rational and can be 
influenced by negative incentives inherent in formal sanctions [36]. ‘Sanction certainty’ refers to the belief of an 
individual that his or her delinquent behaviour will be detected by the relevant authority, while sanction severity 
relates to the belief that he or she will be punished because of his or her delinquent behaviour [37].  Henle and 
Blanchard [38] showed that sanction certainty and severity decrease cyber loafing and abuse of organisational 
equipment. Siponen and Vance [39] presented the effect of these two factors on employees’ compliance with the 
OISP. This research strives to investigate the effect of sanction certainty and severity on employees’ misbehaviour 
in the domain of information security. Hence, the following hypotheses are presented: 
H 1: Sanction certainty positively influences employees’ attitudes towards preventing delinquent behaviour in 
the domain of information security. 
H 2: Sanction severity positively influences employees’ attitudes towards preventing delinquent behaviour in 
the domain of information security. 
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3.2. Increase the Effort 
The difficulty in carrying out an action influences an individual’s attitude and decision to pursue their plan. This 
approach can be applied in order to increase the difficulty of executing violations by employees in organisational 
environments [40]. Account policies and closing the doors of unauthorised data exfiltration, the monitoring of 
facilities, and the strong enforcement of password and access controls are examples of organisational actions that 
make information security violation difficult for offenders [33, 41]. A combination of different methods can be 
more effective in this regard. Authentication should be supplemented by access control to be more effective in 
controlling access to the system or data in organisations. However, traditional access controls, such as role-based 
access controls, are vulnerable to insider threats, unless the access control is updated frequently. Hence, kinds of 
access control in addition to Finger-grained authentication may be an effective strategy to increase the effort 
expended for information security misbehaviour [42]. Therefore, we postulate that: 
 H 3: Increasing the effort for information security misconduct positively influences employees’ attitude 
towards preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of information security. 
3.3. Increase the Risk 
Risk is the potential of gaining or losing valuable things. Losing social status, financial wealth, health and 
reputation are examples of risks that are outcomes of the behaviour of individuals. People think about the 
consequences of their actions before conducting them; the measure of risk influences their attitude towards and 
decision concerning the engagement in a violation or crime [29]. In other words, increasing the risk is associated 
with the increased probability of identifying the offender, detection of the violation by the authority, or 
apprehension resulting from malfeasance [19]. An event management system, auditing and monitoring the actions 
of individuals, using a log correlation engine, reducing anonymity, and monitoring and controlling remote access 
can increase the risk for employees who engage in information security misbehaviour. Insider reporting is another 
effective approach that increases the risk for offenders and improves information security surveillance. The 
prediction of future incidents by investigating similar previous incidents also increases the risk for offenders and 
decreases insider threats [43]. Based on the aforementioned, we hypothesise: 
 H 4: Increasing the risk  for information security misconduct positively influences employees’ attitude towards 
preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of information security. 
3.4. Reduce the Rewards 
Rewards are the extrinsic motivation for individuals’ behaviour in many cases. Rewards encourage them to engage 
in a particular behaviour [44]. ‘Reducing the rewards’ refers to the benefit of the crime in this research, particularly 
when employees sell organisational information assets. Beebe and Rao [45] showed that sanctions are not enough 
to discourage offenders from committing crimes, and that the benefits of their violations should be reduced as an 
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effective approach to dissuade them from conducting crime; the perception of minimal benefit by offenders 
discourages them from perpetrating crime. Encryption (data deformation), watermarking (identifying property), 
information and hardware segregation (removing target), and minimising reconnaissance information (concealing 
targets), are examples of methods that reduce the benefits for employees who engage in information security 
misbehaviour [33]. A digital signature, which shows the validity and integrity of a document that can be used, as 
well as other methods, such as time stamps, reduces the benefit for offenders [46]. Li, Zhang [29] offered 
automatic data destruction mechanisms and insider continuity management as an effective approach that mitigates 
benefits for offenders. Based on the above we conjecture that: 
H 5: Reducing the rewards for information security misconduct positively influences employees’ attitude 
towards preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of information security. 
3.5. Reduce Provocations 
Provocation refers to the action or occurrence that causes someone to do something or become angry. Provocation 
is a stimuli for individuals’ behaviour, they show negative and aggressive behaviour under such conditions [47]. 
By reducing provocation, we try to reduce the emotional causes and motivation for conducting an offence. 
Managing negative issues and preventing disputes in the working environment, decreasing emotional arousal, 
frustration and stress, discouraging imitation and neutralising peer pressure are examples of provocation reduction 
techniques in organisations [23, 48]. Silowash, Cappelli [49] asserted that controls and security policies can be 
misunderstood due to poor communication or inconsistently applied; employees’ involvement in the process of 
development and implementation of information security is a useful approach to counter this issue [50]. Security 
usability could also influence the insider’s negative response towards information security control. Anger, fear, 
guilt, happiness and joy are other factors that affect employees’ attitude towards misbehaviour in the domain of 
information security; management should reduce any provocations that threaten information security in 
organisations [51]. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed in this research: 
H 6: Reducing provocations for information security misconduct positively influences employees’ attitude 
towards preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of information security. 
3.6. Remove Excuses 
Rationalisation and justification of misconduct plays an important role in the formation of crime. Rationalisation 
or making excuses is a defence mechanism to justify and explain a violation in a logical and rational manner. 
Miscreants even try to present their misconduct as being tolerable or admirable by rationalisation [52]. It is 
acknowledged that rationalisation influences the violation of organisational information security policies [27]. 
Sharing a network password for convenience, and justification thereof by contending that nobody will be injured 
by this action, is an example of wrong rationalisation. This kind of rationalisation has a negative impact on 
employees’ behaviour, and even causes employees to knowingly deviate from security policies. They endeavour 
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to decrease their shame and guilt at deliberately violating IT policies by rationalising their motivations. They try 
to present their misconduct as being more normal and necessary than it actually is [39]. Providing clear documents, 
controlling and monitoring, and consistently enforcing policies are approaches that can inhibit the practice of 
making such excuses by individuals. Clarification of information security rules and policies, cyber ethics training, 
alerting conscience and assisting employees in complying with OISPs are other examples of this approach to 
removing excuses from staff. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H 7: Removing excuses for information security misconduct positively influences employees’ attitude towards 
preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of information security. 
3.7. Attitude, Perceived Behavioural Control and Subjective Norms 
The past and present experience of individuals influences their attitude, where by ‘attitude’ we intend to refer to 
the favour or disfavour towards a subject such as an idea, event, a person or other object [8]. In simple terms, 
attitude is the result of an individual’s evaluation concerning a subject in question, ranging from extremely bad to 
extremely good. Attitude also relates to people’s negative or positive views towards conducting a specific 
behaviour. Hepler [53] believed that attitude is a psychological status that is formed based on the individual’s 
stimuli. Attitude influences an individual’s behaviour. The set of beliefs that a person has about an object affects 
his or her attitude, intention, and, ultimately, his or her behaviour. Siponen, Adam Mahmood [11] showed that an 
employee’s attitude influences their behaviour to comply with OISPs. Jeon, Kim [54] revealed that a positive 
attitude about knowledge sharing significantly influences individuals’ behaviour towards sharing their knowledge. 
Therefore, we postulate that: 
H 8: Attitude influences employees’ intention towards preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of 
information security. 
The perceived social pressure to perform or not perform a behaviour manifests subjective norms [55]. Subjective 
norms are the effect of individuals’ opinions about a particular behaviour [22]. Protection of information assets is 
important to management, heads of department, supervisors, colleagues, or, in other words, significant others. 
Subjective norms affect employees’ intentions towards  preventing information security misconduct [23]. In this 
research we postulate that: 
H 9: Subjective norms influence employees’ intention towards preventing delinquent behaviour in the domain of 
information security. 
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One of the important factors in the TPB is perceived behavioural control, by which we mean the perception of the 
hardness or easiness of performing a behaviour or task on the part of the individual [55]. Safa, Sookhak [16] 
showed that perceived behavioural control influences the formation of information security conscious care 
behaviour. In this research, perceived behavioural control relates to the belief that engaging in information security 
behaviour and preventing information security misconduct are not difficult tasks. All employees are able to engage 
in proper information security behaviour. This is why we present the hypothesis below: 
H 10: Perceived behavioural control influences employees’ intention towards preventing delinquent behaviour in 
the domain of information security. 
3.8. Intention 
Intention is an important element in the formation of behaviour. Intention represents a commitment to carry out 
an action, either now or in the future. Intention contains the concept of planning and forethought [56]. Based on 
the TPB, attitude, perceived behavioural control and subjective norms play key roles in the creation of intention 
in order to achieve goals [34]. In other words, a desire towards achieving a goal that satisfies a person’s generates 
an intention to engage in behaviour that promotes that goal in him or her. Shropshire, Warkentin [8] revealed that 
intention significantly affects the adoption of information security behaviour in organisations. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H 11: Intention to prevent misbehaviour mitigates insider threats in organisations. 
Figure 2 depicts the conceptual model and hypotheses in a concise form. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework 
Table 1 shows definition of the factors in the conceptual framework. 
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Table 1: Definition of factors in the research model 
Theories Constructs Definitions in this research 
General 
Deterrence Theory 
(employees’ 
perception) 
Sanction Certainty Refers to the belief that the authority will detect his or her 
delinquent behaviour. 
Sanction Severity Refers to the belief that the authority will consider a punishment, 
such as fine, dismissal or even jail based on the effect of his or her 
delinquent behaviour. 
Situational Crime 
Prevention Theory 
(environmental 
factors-opportunity 
reduction) 
Increase the Effort Refers to difficulty of committing a delinquent behaviour, which 
may dissuade offender from conducting crime. 
Increase the Risk Refers to the consequence of delinquent behaviour, such as job 
termination. 
Reduce the Rewards Refers to the decreasing benefits or revenue of the delinquent 
behaviour. 
Reduce Provocations Refers to mitigating or removing noxious stimuli, such as conflict, 
unnecessary stress or competition from the workplace. 
Remove Excuses Refers to removing the rationalisations of the delinquent behaviour. 
Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
(behaviour 
formation) 
Attitude Refers to an expression of disfavour or favour towards an object, 
such as secure information behaviour. 
Perceived 
Behavioural Control 
Refers to the difficulty of the behaviour (secure information 
behaviour). 
Subjective Norms Refers to performing or not performing the behaviour. 
Intention Represents a commitment to act with forethought and planning now 
or in future. 
Actual Behaviour Refers to the mitigation of insecure information behaviour (insider 
threats) in organisations. 
 
4. Research methodology 
This study strives to show how management can mitigate the risk of insider threats by focusing on a preventative 
approach in organisations.  A literature review from high quality journals, besides the theoretical background and 
expert views increases the reliability of the conceptual model. The research model was improved by expert 
feedback and by use of the Delphi method. The framework was improved using qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The data was collected from several organisations in the UK. A questionnaire using Likert scales was 
used for data gathering. 
The model was created based on the literature review and theoretical background. That is why Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA) was considered in order to determine whether the measurement model (MM) confirms our 
understanding of the constructs. In simple terms, whether our hypotheses are confirmed by the data that we have 
collected. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) has been acknowledged as a suitable method to investigate the 
relationships among the independent, mediating and dependent variables in such a model [57]. The Maximum 
Likelihood method in IBM Amos 20 was used to assess the measurement and structural models  [58]. The other 
statistical measurements that demonstrate the reliability of the conceptual model have presented in Table 5. 
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4.1. Data collection  
Data gathering was conducted on the employees of several companies that are active in the domain of e-
Commerce, banking and education. The questions in the questionnaire were developed on the basis of the 
framework structure and the concepts of factors. In this step, we also considered previous similar studies and 
adopted questions therefrom. To reply to the questions, a range of options from strongly agree to strongly disagree 
(Likert Scales) was used. We explained the aims of this study to participants and kindly requested that they answer 
the questions on the bases of their experience and opinion. The consent of respondents to participate in this 
research was important to us; after indication of their consent, we asked them to start answering the questions. 
We confirmed that this data would be only used for academic purposes and kept confidential.  
Whether the questions were applicable, comprehendible and subject to a single interpretation on the part of the 
respondents would have a significant effect on the results. That is why we pilot-tested the questionnaire with 42 
participants before distribution. We looked at their hesitation, emotions and descriptions during the pilot test. 
Based on their reaction and comments, we revised and improved some of the questions to increase the reliability 
of the questionnaire. The last version of the questionnaire included 51 questions, each factor was indicated by 
various items (questions). Table 3 shows in a clear manner how every factor is measured using several items.  
4.2. Demography 
Data collection is usually a time-consuming process; we used two approaches to data collection – a paper-based 
questionnaire and an electronic questionnaire – in order to expedite the procedure. The questionnaire was hosted 
on Google Drive and was emailed to employees for whom we had email addresses. Four hundred and eighty-six 
respondents answered the questions, of which 152 used the paper-based questionnaire and 334 used Google Drive. 
We immediately reviewed the responses and asked the respondents to kindly complete the questions to which 
they have not replied, thereby decreasing the number of incomplete questions in the paper-based questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, nine questionnaires (5.2%) were discarded due to incomplete answers, or because the respondent 
replied to all the questions in a similar manner. 
Google Form helped us to distribute the questionnaire effectively and efficiently through the Internet. The 
electronic questionnaire was emailed to those employees for whom we had email addresses. Thirty-three 
electronic questionnaires were discarded from three hundred and thirty-four, due to incomplete responses or 
inappropriate status. Finally, four hundred and forty-four responses were considered and transferred to the main 
dataset for data analysis. Table 2 shows the demography of the participants. 
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Table 2: Participants’ characteristics 
Measure Items Frequency Per cent 
Gender Male 246 55.4 
Female 198 44.6 
Age 21 to 30 116 26.1 
31 to 40 198 44.61 
41 to 50 81 18.25 
Above 50 49 11.04 
Position Employee 398 89.64 
Chief employee 36 8.11 
Management 10 2.25 
Work experience 1 to 2 years 98 22.1 
3 to 5 years 222 50 
Above 5 years 124 27.9 
Education Diploma 36 8.1 
Bachelor 298 67.12 
Master 101 22.75 
PhD 9 2.03 
 
5. Results 
The research variables are usually unquantifiable and unobservable (latent), and are usually measured by several 
items, such as perceived sanction certainty and severity, effort, risk and so forth. The MM and SM are two 
important parts of data analysis in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) that can be used to show the validity and 
reliability of the research model. The MM displays the relationship between the variables (items) and the main 
factors. In other words, the MM shows that these items measure the relevant factor appropriately. The reliability 
and validity of the observed variables (items) were tested before the MM was fitted to the data. The SM 
investigates the relationship between the unobservable variables (factors). SEM is the most appropriate method 
for this kind of research model [58].  
5.1. Measurement model 
SEM explores the relationship among the variables and confirms or rejects the hypotheses. SEM not only 
estimates the regression among the latent variables, but also isolates the error when it measures the latent variables. 
The normality of data distribution shows what kinds of tests should be used in data analysis; that is why skewness 
and kurtosis tests were used in the first step of data analysis. The results were between -2 and +2, which shows a 
normal distribution [59]. The research model was developed based on the literature review with a theoretical 
background, which is why confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was considered to be a suitable approach for this 
research. CFA investigates whether the measured variables are consistent with our understanding of the variables 
and factors in the research model [60]. 
Convergent validity was explored using factor loading of the variables (items). A factor loading of more than 0.5 
shows acceptable convergent validity [58]. The items with a factor loading of less than 0.5 were discarded from 
the research model. The IR3 in the Increase the Risk, RP2 in the Reduce Provocation, RE4 from Remove Excuses 
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and PBC3 from Perceived Behavioural Control were extracted from the model due to their lesser factor loading 
on the related constructs. Cronbach’s Alpha indicates the internal consistency and shows the correlation among 
the items (observable variables) used to measure a factor (unobservable variables). A Cronbach’s Alpha with a 
measure more than 0.7 indicates acceptable internal consistency for the model [61].  Some of the statistical 
measures that relate to factors and the items that measure them have been presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: The factors, items, and their descriptive statistics 
Construct Items Mean Std 
Dev 
CFA 
Loading 
Composite 
reliability 
Perceived 
Sanction 
Certainty 
(PSC) 
 
PSC1 
I believe that if I violate confidentiality of 
information the management will realise it. 
3.92 .78 .612 
.816 
PSC2 
I believe that if I transfer organisational information 
outside the management will find out my violation. 
4.01 .82 .714 
PSC3 
I believe that if I sell organisational information my 
organisation will discover it. 
4.12 .76 .592 
PSC4 
I believe that if I do not comply with OISPs and 
procedures my boss will detect it. 
4.08 .92 .696 
Perceived 
Sanction 
Severity 
(PSS) 
PSS1 
I think the consequences of the violation of OISPs are 
very bad for me. 
4.06 1.01 .648 
.786 
PSS2 
I deserve punishment if I violate the confidentiality of 
organisational information. 
3.82 .92 .724 
PSS3 
I think punishment will be high if I sell or transfer 
organisational information outside.  
4.16 .82 .764 
PSS4 
I think receiving sanctions because of my information 
security misconduct will negatively influence my 
career development. 
3.96 .76 .623 
Increase the 
Effort 
(IE)  
IE1 
Control of information access affects my attitude to 
be careful about my information security behaviour. 
3.86 .88 .722 
.698 
IE2 
Trying to pass authentication systems influences my 
attitude to prevent misbehaviour. 
4.02 .92 .762 
IE3 
Access to isolated sensitive information needs more 
effort that influences my attitude to prevent 
misconduct. 
4.12 .82 .742 
IE4 
Surveillance on employees’ access to information 
affects my attitude to prevent violation of information 
policies. 
3.98 .84 .816 
Increase the 
Risk 
(IR)  
IR1 
Tracking my access to information on the systems 
affects my attitude to prevent information security 
misconduct. 
4.21 .92 .722 
.716 
IR2 
Reducing anonymity influences my attitude to avoid 
information security misbehaviour. 
3.98 .79 .736 
IR3 
Monitoring and controlling access to information 
influences my attitude to be careful about my 
behaviour. 
4.28 .76 Dropped 
IR4 
Possibility of identification by management 
influences my attitude to avoid information security 
misconduct. 
4.04 .84 .698 
Reduce the 
Rewards 
(RR) 
RR1 
Automatic data destruction eliminates benefits of 
information for offenders and dissuades them from 
misbehaviour. 
4.02 .92 .668 
.792 
RR2 
Encryption of data removes benefits of information 
and prevents information security misconduct. 
4.11 8.86 .748 
RR3 
Watermarking eliminates personal benefits and 
prevents information security misbehaviour. 
3.94 1.02 .764 
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RR4 
Elimination of benefits influences employees’ 
attitude to prevent information security misconduct in 
organisations. 
4.04 .89 .769 
Reduce 
Provocations 
(RP) 
RP1 
Avoiding disputes reduces provocation and 
positively influences my attitude to avoid 
misbehaviour. 
4.12 .78 .746 
.806 
RP2 
Reducing my stress decreases provocation for 
information security misbehaviour. 
3.98 .86 Dropped 
RP3 
Elimination of employees’ frustration mitigates 
provocation for information security 
misbehaviour. 
4.16 .82 .724 
RP4 
Reducing emotional arousal decreases 
provocation and positively influences my 
attitude to avoid misconduct. 
3.86 .78 .782 
RP5 
I believe reducing provocations in organisations 
positively influences my attitude to avoid 
misbehaviour. 
4.13 .91 .728 
Remove Excuses 
(RE) 
RE1 
Clarification of information security policies 
positively influences my attitude to avoid 
misbehaviour. 
4.02 1.04 .746 
.726 
RE2 
Cyber ethics training positively influences my 
attitude to avoid misbehaviour. 
3.96 .86 .821 
RE3 
Assisting compliance with organisational 
information security policies positively 
influences my attitude to avoid misbehaviour. 
4.16 .92 .764 
RE4 
Alerting employees’ conscience positively 
influences my attitude to avoid misbehaviour. 
4.04 .83 Dropped 
RE5 
Removing excuses from organisational 
environment positively affects my attitude to 
avoid misbehaviour. 
3.98 .86 .804 
Attitude 
(AT) 
AT1 
Safe information security behaviour protects 
information assets in organisations. 
4.04 .81 .726 
.684 
AT2 
Appropriate information security behaviour mitigates 
the risk of information security breaches in 
organisations. 
4.16 .92 .748 
AT3 
Safe information security behaviour decreases 
information security incidents in organisations. 
4.06 .84 .728 
AT4 
Proper information security behaviour is a good 
practice.  
4.18 .78 .722 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
(PBC) 
 
PBC1 
I have the necessary abilities to have safe information 
security behaviour. 
3.94 .92 .768 
.748 
PBC2 
I am able to mitigate information security threats in 
my organisation. 
4.14 .84 .726 
PBC3 
Safe information security behaviour is an easy task 
for me. 
3.94 .89 Dropped 
PBC4 
I have enough knowledge to behave safe in terms of 
information security. 
4.12 1.01 .546 
Subjective 
Norms 
(SN) 
 
SN1 
My colleagues think that we should behave safe to 
protect organisational information assets. 
4.18 .92 .688 
.802 
SN2 
The head of department believes that we should 
protect organisational information assets. 
3.82 .94 .592 
SN3 
The senior staff in my company have a positive view 
about the protection of information by employees. 
4.01 1.03 .728 
SN4 
My friends in my office encourage me to have safe 
information security behaviour. 
4.12 .82 .684 
Intention 
(IN) 
IN1 
I am willing to safeguard organisational information 
assets. 
3.86 .96 .628 .782 
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IN2 
I intentionally help my colleagues to increase 
information security. 
4.08 .92 .728 
IN3 
I collaborate with other staff to decrease insider 
threats in my organisation. 
4.12 .85 .698 
IN4 I plan to have safe information security behaviour. 4.04 .92 .592 
Actual 
Behaviour 
(AB) 
AB1 
I try to avoid mistakes in the domain of information 
security. 
3.92 .86 .738  
AB2 I always try to mitigate information security threats. 4.08 1.02 .766  
AB3 
I think about the consequences of my behaviour 
before any action. 
3.89 .96 .686 .812 
AB4 
I am careful about my behaviour in the domain of 
information security. 
4.14 .88 .594  
AB5 
I frequently asses my information security behaviour 
to improve it. 
    
OISPs: Organisational Information Security Policies 
Factor loading from confirmatory factor analysis. 
t-value is significant at p < 0.05 
 
Different factors were linked to another in order to be assured about convergent and discriminant validity of the 
model. The factors are independent and unique. Convergent validity shows whether there is any relationship 
between factors in the model and with each other. Discriminant validity investigates the lack of correlation 
between factors that they should not have relationship in the model. Table 4 shows the correlation between 
different constructs [58].  
Table 4: Correlation between different constructs 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 PSC 4.04 0.94 0.826            
2 PSS 4.12 0.82 0.402 0.848           
3 IE 4.08 0.78 0.304 0.422 0.779          
4 IR 4.18 1.02 0.468 0.346 0.422 0.798         
5 RR 4.06 1.04 0.487 0.424 0.437 0.265 0.896        
6 RP 4.12 0.96 0.498 0.252 0.258 0.286 0.221 0.887       
7 RE 4.14 0.98 0.248 0.514 0.362 0.266 0.432 0.494 0.822      
8 AT 4.22 1.02 0.612 0.522 0.521 0.716 0.695 0.546 0.536 0.868     
9 PBC 4.26 1.14 0.188 0.234 0.198 0.247 0.226 0.288 0.368 0.442 0.724    
10 SN 4.04 0.86 0.438 0.538 0.623 0.636 0.248 0.506 0.484 0.368 0.564 0.829   
11 IN 4.14 1.18 0.356 0.366 0.253 0.184 0.198 0.282 0.268 0.623 0.639 0.562 0.836  
12 AB 4.02 0.98 0.204 0.218 0.224 0.329 0.248 0.198 0.326 0.348 0.336 0.394 0.644 0.746 
 
5.2. Testing the structural model 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) applies different statistical tests to examine a theoretical model or 
conceptual framework. SEM not only investigates all relationships between different variables, but also isolates 
observational errors from the measurements of latent variables. SEM tests the overall data fit to the model and 
presents reliable measurement. IBM AMOS version 20 is the statistical software that has been used in this 
research. 
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A review of literature helped us to develop the research model and the entire model has been covered by three 
basic theories, so that the reliability of the model is increased. For this reason, Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) was applied instead of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Fit indices play important roles regarding the 
validity of the model; Comparative and Global fit measures were applied to investigate fit indices. Table 5 displays 
the model fit indices in a concise format. 
Table 5: Model fit indices 
Fit indices Model 
value 
Acceptable 
standard 
ᵪ𝟐 1002.62 - 
ᵡ𝟐/Df 1.92 <2 
GFI 0.926 >0.9 
AGFI 0.964 >0.9 
CFI 0.933 >0.9 
IFI 0.908 >0.9 
NFI 0.942 >0.9 
RMSEA 0.076 <0.08 
  
The results of the data analysis are presented in Table 6. The findings showed that the paths from perceived 
sanction certainty (β=0.722, p=0.005), perceived sanction severity (β=0.789, p=0.004), increase the effort 
(β=0.642, p=0.011), increase the risk (β=0.522, p=0.021), reduce the rewards (β=0.703, p=0.007) towards safe 
information security attitudes were significant. However, the effect of reducing the provocation and removing 
excuses towards attitudes were not significant. Therefore, H6 and H7 are rejected. The findings also revealed that 
attitude (β=0.685, p=0.009), perceived behavioural control (β=0.561, p=0.019), and subjective norms (β=0.726, 
p=0.001) towards intention to secure information behaviour were significant. Finally, the results showed that the 
intention to protect information security behaviour (β=0.798, p=0.001) had significant effects on the employees’ 
behaviour towards mitigating insider threats in organisations. 
Table 6: The results of the hypotheses testing 
Path Standardized 
estimate  
p-Value Results 
PSC  AT 0.722 0.005 Support 
PSS   AT 0.789 0.004 Support 
IE  AT 0.642 0.011 Support 
IR  AT 0.522 0.021 Support 
RR  AT 0.703 0.007 Support 
RP  AT 0.598 0.064 Not-Supported 
RE  AT 0.424 0.056 Not-Supported 
AT  IN 0.685 0.009 Support 
PBC  IN 0.561 0.019 Support 
SN  IN 0.726 0.001 Support 
IN  AB 0.798 0.001 Support 
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6. Contribution and implementation 
The significant aspect of this study is derived from the inclusion of the deterrence and crime prevention 
approaches that are the results of two basic theories – Deterrence and Situational Crime Prevention Theory. The 
presented factors dissuade employees from information security misconduct in organisations, and, consequently, 
mitigate insider threats. Both theories have the same effect on individuals’ attitudes, but the GDT emphasises the 
individual’s perception and attitude, and Situational Crime Prevention Theory highlights the environmental 
restrictions which function to mitigate insider threats.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is among the first studies to conceptualise insider threat prevention on the bases 
of prevention and deterrence. This synthesis constitutes a new perspective which enables organisations to better 
manage insider threats. We believe that this complements the previous studies that have been carried out in this 
domain. 
The output of statistical analysis revealed that perceived sanction certainty and severity influence individuals’ 
attitudes towards preventing information security misconduct in organisations. This finding is in-line with the 
output of Cheng, Li [23]. The results also showed that increasing the effort, risk and reducing the rewards 
significantly influences employees’ attitudes towards preventing information security misbehaviour. A plausible 
reason for this finding might be the high risk and low benefit of their misconduct that affects their final decision 
to prevent information security misbehaviour. Contrary to our expectation, reducing provocation and excuses did 
not significantly affect an individual’s attitude towards preventing information security misconduct. One 
conceivable explanation for this finding might be in the culture of the people in the UK. Moral values are important 
in their culture, and personal affairs do not influence their duties in the work place. The results also showed that 
a negative attitude towards information security misbehaviour, perceived behavioural control (belief that having 
safe information security behaviour is an easy task), and personal norms (belief that information security 
misconduct is a negative behaviour), all influence employees’ intention to engage in information security 
misbehaviour. Indeed, these factors originate from the Theory of Planned Behaviour that has been applied in many 
studies previously in this domain [4, 16, 22]. The results of the statistical analysis and the review of the literature 
demonstrate the soundness and effectiveness of the proposed model. 
7. Conclusion, Limitations and future work 
Information technology has changed organisational activities so as to make them become faster, and more 
effective and efficient. However, protection of information is still a challenging subject for all companies. 
Anecdotal and empirical evidence has shown that insider threats are responsible for a significant portion of the 
risk in the domain of information security [43, 62]. This research endeavours to improve and diversify research 
on information security insider threats in organisations through the Deterrence and Situational Crime Prevention 
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Theories. Factors, such as perceived sanction certainty and severity, increasing the effort and risk for information 
security misconduct, and reducing the rewards have a significant effect on employees’ attitude towards preventing 
misbehaviour. In addition, a negative attitude towards information security misconduct, perceived behavioural 
control and personal norms influence individuals’ intention, and, ultimately, their behaviour in order to mitigate 
insider threats in organisations. 
The research model encompasses three main sections. The first part relates to the employees’ perception of 
sanctions. The second part refers to the restrictions and controls (environmental factors), such as increasing the 
effort and risk, decreasing the rewards and provocations, and removing excuses. Finally, the third part shows how 
mitigation of insider threats forms in organisations. Looking at the model, it can be seen that insider threat is a 
managerial issue and controllable. It is clear that insider threats can be managed through psychological, 
managerial and technological aspects regarding information security. 
To extend this research, we can look at the problem statement (insider threats) from different perspectives; this 
research can be continued further by focusing on the role of organisational values and culture. Moral values 
dissuade individuals from misconduct. Another clue for developing this research is the effect of organisational 
bonds, such as attachment to one’s organisation, involvement in information security, commitment to 
organisational policies and plans, and, finally, personal norms such as the norm that having safe information 
security behaviour is a positive factor and the norm that information security misconduct a negative behaviour. 
Motivation for crime is an important factor in delinquent behaviour. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can also be 
the focus of future research in this domain. 
This research faced several limitations. OISPs play an important role in the mitigation of information security 
breaches. We tried to collect data from organisations that had established OISPs, as employees in such companies 
are aware of the importance of information security. They can better understand the purpose of this study and the 
concepts that are used in the questionnaire. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of such companies in the UK. 
Collecting data in the domain of information security, even in non-military organisations, is a difficult task. The 
data was collected from companies from which we obtained permission for data collection. The precision and 
generalisation of the results can be improved with a bigger sample size and by increasing the number of companies 
investigated. If possible, data collection can also be extended to other countries in future research. The data was 
gathered by Google Drive which is sensitive, as it is based on participants’ email addresses. This means that 
participants with more than one email address can answer the questionnaire two or more times. Although the 
probability of participation more than once is almost zero, we would have operated with a facility to check this 
problem or check their IP address to detect them. In this way we would have been able to recognise participants 
with two or more responses.  
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